https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/583/ First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing such an office in the DOJ. We conduct what we think is the first thorough examination of the statutes structuring the DOJ to show that the statutory provisions relied upon by the DOJ and lower courts for the appointment of Special Counsels over the past two decades do not – and even obviously do not – authorize the creation and appointment of Special Counsels at the level of United States Attorneys. They authorize the creation and appointment of Special Counsels to “assist” United States Attorneys, and they allow existing Senate-confirmed United States Attorneys to serve also as Special Counsels, but they do not remotely authorize the creation of the kind of Special Counsels represented by Robert Mueller who replace rather than assist United States Attorneys. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), does not hold to the contrary, because no question was raised in that case about the validity of the independent counsel’s appointment. Second, even if one chooses to overlook the absence of statutory authority for the position, there is no statute specifically authorizing the Attorney General, rather than the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint such a Special Counsel. Under the Appointments Clause, inferior officers can be appointed by department heads only if Congress so directs by statute – and so directs specifically enough to overcome a clear-statement presumption in favor of presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation. No such statute exists for the Special Counsel. Third, the Special Counsel is, in all events, a superior rather than inferior officer and thus cannot be appointed by any means other than presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation regardless of what any statutes purport to say. This is obviously true as a matter of original meaning, and it is even true as a matter of case law once one understands that neither Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), nor Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), can plausibly be read to say that any person who is in any fashion subordinate to another executive official is an “inferior” officer. Such a reading leads to the ludicrous result that there is only one non-inferior officer in every federal department, which is a good reason not to read them that way.

If only they followed the bolded part of the rule, I’m fine with the rest.

Ray Epps.

She literally has the ability to get every player more money and they want nothing more than to destroy her.   

Not true at all.  As of last year they are allowed to run stop signs. Here is the excerpt since Google > you. Sec. 7.  Minnesota Statutes 2022, section 169.222, is amended by adding a subdivision to read: Subd. 4a.  Stopping requirements.  (a) For purposes of this subdivision, "in the vicinity" means located in an intersection or approaching an intersection in a manner that constitutes a hazard of collision during the time that a bicycle operator would occupy the intersection. (b) A bicycle operator who approaches a stop sign must slow to a speed that allows for stopping before entering the intersection or the nearest crosswalk. Notwithstanding subdivision 1 and section 169.06, subdivision 4, if there is not a vehicle in the vicinity, the operator may make a turn or proceed through the intersection without stopping. (c) A bicycle operator who approaches a traffic-control signal with a steady red indication, including a circular red signal or red arrow signal, must slow to a speed that allows for stopping before entering the intersection or the nearest crosswalk. Notwithstanding subdivision 1 and section 169.06, subdivision 5, if there is not a vehicle in the vicinity, the operator: (1) may make a right-hand turn, or a left-hand turn onto a one-way roadway, without stopping; and (2) must otherwise perform a complete stop and then may make a turn or proceed through the intersection before the traffic-control signal indication changes to green. (d) Nothing in this subdivision alters the right-of-way requirements under section 169.20. The provisions under this subdivision do not apply when traffic is controlled by a peace officer or a person authorized to control traffic under section 169.06.